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a b s t r a c t 
Consistent with current emotion theory, we should note that contempt is 
not a homogeneous category but rather shows intracategorial variability. 
Previous research on Spanish samples shows a communicative structure 
in which contempt is felt towards intimate, social or abstract receivers, for 
reciprocal, altruistic or prejudiced reasons. Our objective was to test, on a 
large and heterogeneous sample, the previously found structure and varia-
tions of the experience of contempt as well as its spontaneous facial expression. 
Testing the association of contempt varieties with certain subject attributes 
was a secondary goal. Results from 130 participants from the Spanish gen-
eral population corroborated the previously found structure and varieties, 
as well as the associations between contempt receiver and attribution. No 
relation was found with sex, age or emotion recognition ability. As to spon-
taneous facial expression, disgust was more often expressed by those who 
narrated their personal episodes of contempt for reciprocal reasons, and 
was less often expressed by the people who described prejudiced scenarios. 
This result indicates that the conventionally considered facial expression 
of contempt is not the only one, as already stated by Darwin, and should 
not be considered as such by experimental and psychometric procedures.
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r e s u m e n
De forma consistente con las teorías actuales de la emoción, el desprecio 
no es una categoría homogénea, sino que presenta variedad intracatego-
rial. La investigación previa en muestras españolas muestra una estructura 
comunicativa en la que el desprecio se experimenta hacia receptores ínti-
mos, sociales o abstractos por razones recíprocas, altruistas o prejuiciosas. 
Nuestro objetivo fue poner a prueba, en una muestra grande y heterogénea, 
la estructura previamente encontrada para la experiencia de desprecio, así 
como sus variedades y expresión facial espontánea. Un objetivo secundario 
fue la puesta a prueba de la asociación de las variedades del desprecio con 
atributos de sujeto. Los resultados de 130 entrevistas procedentes de pobla-
ción general española corroboraron la estructura y variedades previamente 
halladas, así como la asociación entre el receptor del desprecio y la atribu-
ción causal. La relación con el sexo, la edad y la aptitud de reconocimiento 
emocional no resultó significativa. Con respecto a la expresión facial, la 
de asco apareció con mayor frecuencia en quienes narraron episodios de 
desprecio por razones de reciprocidad y con menor frecuencia en quienes 
describieron escenarios prejuiciosos. Este resultado indica que la expresión 
convencionalmente considerada como de desprecio no es la única, como ya 
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estableció Darwin, por lo que no debería considerarse como 
tal en los procedimientos experimentales y psicométricos. 
Palabras clave autores
Validez de constructo, asco, desprecio, reconomiento emocional. 
Palabras clave adicionales
Variabilidad intracategorial, Psicología moral, investigación 
cuantitativa.
Contempt is one of the most culturally variable 
emotions (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Elfenbein, 
Beaupré, Lévesque & Hess, 2007). It is an espe-
cially salient emotion in Spain (Delgado, 2009a) 
although, consistent with current emotion theory, 
we should note that it is not a homogeneous cat-
egory but rather shows intracategorial variability 
(Barrett, 2009). 
Previous research on Spanish samples shows 
a communicative structure in which contempt is 
typically felt for someone (a) who has done some-
thing wrong to the participant, (b) who has done 
something wrong to a third party, or (c) whose char-
acteristics are disliked (Delgado, 2009b; Delgado 
& Márquez, (2013). These varieties, reflecting the 
Why, will be called reciprocal, altruistic and preju-
diced, respectively. The usual association between 
contempt and prejudice (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick 
& xu, 2002) also appears in these data: contempt 
episodes reflecting prejudice are always modal, but 
altruistic and reciprocal motives are also reported. 
As to the objects or receivers of contempt, reflecting 
the Whom, they were also bottom-up classified in 
threes: intimate, social and abstract. Phenomeno-
logical analysis of self-reported personal experiences 
has shown some reciprocal episodes in which the 
object of contempt is a loved person or a friend, 
i.e., someone close in the psychological space, but 
abstract receivers are still modal (Delgado, 2009b). 
It has also been found that the use of the term 
“contempt” (in Spanish ‘desprecio’) relates to at 
least one of the following elements: an avoiding atti-
tude, a negative experience or a feeling of superiority, 
which is consistent with expert opinion, although 
some kind of rejection is mentioned more than 
expected for a “cold” emotion. Delgado (2009b) 
found that avoiding was the most mentioned ele-
ment, followed by negativity; although contempt 
is usually described as an emotion associated with 
social hierarchy, superiority was in fact the least 
frequent of the three.
In the Moral Psychology field, where emotions 
are increasingly being taken into account, con-
tempt, anger and disgust –the CAD triad– are 
regarded as affective reactions to the violation of 
different community duties (Haidt, 2007; Rozin, 
Lowery, Imada & Haidt, 1999). Evolutionary theo-
ries have described moral offences as sociocogni-
tive extensions of the disgust evaluation system 
(Rozin, Haidt & Fincher, 2009). However, the fact 
that some moral offence triggers the same facial 
motor activity as core disgust elicitors (Chapman, 
Kim, Susskind & Anderson, 2009) is not a robust 
corroboration of the disgust exaptation hypothesis 
(Rozin et al., 2009). Alternative views such as Dar-
win’s (1872) –that a slight turning up of the nose 
is one of the common contempt expressions– are 
compatible with these results. Corroborating Dar-
win’s view is the fact that spontaneous expressions 
that would be conventionally coded as disgust faces 
have been registered while people narrate episodes 
of contempt (Delgado, 2009b). 
As to altruism, even though reciprocity has a 
star role in the current moral psychology (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 2005), it is still considered that truly moral 
choices imply doing something for a third party 
when egoistic motivation would lead us to act in 
a different way. Emotions seem to be important 
proximate factors behind altruistic punishment 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza & 
Zahn, 2008). In this sense, the moral role of anger 
has already been described (Averill, 1982).
Currently, the main methodological critique 
against moral psychology has to do with the lack of 
representativeness that makes generalization prob-
lematic (Baumard & Sperber, 2010). Volunteers 
solving artificial moral dilemmas in laboratories 
(Bloom, 2010) do not seem a good recipe for achiev-
ing construct validity. Thus our first objective was 
to corroborate (or else refute) the previously found 
structure and variations of the experience of con-
tempt with a heterogeneous sample, as well as the 
associated spontaneous facial expression. Testing 
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attributes (age, gender and emotion recognition 
abilities) was a secondary goal. In this way, we con-
trol by inclusion some variables that could serve as 
plausible explanations for the intracategorial vari-
ability of contempt. 
Method
Participants
Some 130 participants from the Spanish general 
population were selected in the downtown of a 
monumental city and interviewed in a quiet room 
in a Historical building. The sample was composed 
of 63 females and 67 males. They belonged to all 
age groups (M = 42.6; SD = 16.11; range = 18-75). 
Regarding their geographic procedence, 15 out of 17 
were from Spanish autonomous communities, and 
two from autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla).
Procedure
The participants were interviewed about (a) their 
general idea of contempt, (b) a typical contempt 
episode, and (c) a personal episode. Later on, they 
completed tasks of emotional recognition (caucasic 
faces from JACBART) and expression. Interviews 
were registered with a MacBook portable computer 
with iSight webcam and saved in iMovie. The 130 
participants provided informed consent.
The three elements of the general idea of con-
tempt (avoiding, negativity and superiority) were 
coded as present or absent and then added up: two 
subjects that obtained a zero score were eliminated 
from the sample, given their inability to define con-
tempt in even the most basic way. Both the typical 
and personal episodes were categorized by means 
of two concurrent category systems each, describ-
ing the receivers (intimate, social and abstract) 
and reasons (reciprocal, altruistic and prejudiced) 
of contempt. No other category showed prevalence 
and we therefore considered that saturation was 
reached.
Two “blind” observers, carefully selected to 
warrant a very high level of reading comprehen-
sion, independently read and coded the transcribed 
interviews. They met afterwards in order to com-
ment their disagreements and solve them when 
possible. Kappa values were calculated to estimate 
the interobserver consistency that ranged from 0.73 
(typical episode object) to 0.95 (personal episode 
object). 
As to the spontaneous contempt, anger and 
disgust expressions, they were coded by the second 
author, who had been instructed to detect micro 
expressions and subtle expressions with training 
software based on Ekman (2003) until reaching 
the maximum accuracy level. The expressions were 
registered from mute videos of the interviews and 
then coded as present or absent. Kappa values for 
intraobserver consistency were 0.54 (contempt), 
0.83 (disgust) and 0.76 (anger). Data from the sec-
ond occasion (one-month separated from the first) 
will be reported here, although it must be noted that 
the results calculated with the first occasion’s data 
do give rise to the same conclusions.
Results
The 128 participants mentioned at least one of the 
three elements previously found in definitions of 
contempt. Negativity was the most salient of the 
three (f = 114), followed by some sort of avoid-
ing (f = 76), and superiority (f = 41). As already 
mentioned, data from the two participants who 
failed to mention any of these elements were not 
considered further. 
One hundred and twenty subjects told typical 
episodes that could be coded with the attribution 
and receiver categories. Concerning attributions, 
the expected order, from a previous small sample 
study, was (1) prejudiced, (2) altruistic, (3) recipro-
cal, but results (see Table 1) show that prejudiced 
motives are followed in frequency by reciprocal 
and then altruistic ones. As predicted from previ-
ous research, the abstract receivers were followed, 
in frequency, by social and intimate ones. The as-
sociation between these nominal scale variables 
was statistically significant and medium-sized, 
χ2 (4) = 13.15, Cramer’s V = 0.23, p = 0.011. 
Table 1 cells show corrected standardized re-
siduals indicating that contempt is, more than AnA DelgADo, MArgAritA Márquez
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expected under null hypothesis, thought to be felt 
for close others who have done wrong to the person 
feeling the emotion; or for people in the abstract 
(including institutions) due to their intrinsic at-
tributes, i.e., prejudice. As expected, the latter was 
the modal typical episode. 
Association tests between attribution 
and spontaneous expressions of contempt 
(χ2 (2) = 1.30, Cramer’s V = 0.10, p = 0.523), dis-
gust (χ2 (2) = 0.94, Cramer’s V = 0.09, p = 0.624), 
and anger (χ2 (2)0= 1.85, Cramer’s V = 0.12, 
p = 0.396) were no significant and small-sized. 
Neither was the association of attribution with 
gender significant, χ2 (2) = 3.54, Cramer’s V = 0.17, 
p = 0.17. One-way ANOVAs were carried out to 
test for significant differences associated to attri-
bution in age (F (2, 117) = 0.217, p = 0.805) and 
emotion recognition ability (F (2, 117) = 1.22, 
p = 0.299). No significant differences were found.
As to personal episodes, 90 participants report-
ed episodes that could be coded with the attribution 
categories. Of these, 89 could be coded with the 
receiver categories as well. (Among the remaining 
cases, there were people who insisted in that they 
had never felt contempt for another person or who 
told stories in which they were the victims of con-
tempt, despite being politely reminded of the real 
question by the interviewer). The expected order 
was: reciprocal, prejudiced and altruistic. However, 
as with typical episodes, prejudiced motives were 
followed in frequency by reciprocal and altruistic 
ones (see Table 2). As to receivers, the expected 
order was abstract, social, intimate. The results 
show abstract receivers followed by intimate and 
social ones (that show very similar frequencies). 
The association between attribution and receiver 
variables was statistically significant and large-
sized, χ2 (4) = 28.97, Cramer’s V = 0.40, p < 0.001. 
Table 2 cells show corrected standardized re-
siduals indicating that contempt is, more than 
expected under the null hypothesis, felt towards 
intimate and social others who have done us wrong, 
or for abstract objects due to either altruistic or 
prejudiced reasons.
Association tests between attribution and spon-
taneous expressions of contempt (χ2 (2) = 0.98, Cra-
mer’s V = 0.10, p = 0.613) and anger (χ2 (2) = 1.65, 
Cramer’s V = 0.14, p = 0.437) were no significant 
and small-sized. However, we find a significant as-
sociation of attributions with spontaneous expres-
sions of disgust (χ2 (2) = 7.89, Cramer’s V = 0.30, 
p = 0.019).
Table 3 shows corrected standardized residuals 
indicating that disgust was more often spontane-
table 1 
Typical: Attribution by Receiver. Frequency (Corrected Standardized Residual)
Intimate Social Abstract Total
Attribution Reciprocal  3 (3.2)  3 (1.4)  14 (-3.0)  20
Altruistic  0 (-.6)  0 (-.9)  9 ( 1.1)  9
Prejudice  1 (-2.4)  6 (-.7)  84 ( 2.0)  91
Total  4  9 107 120
Source: own work
table 2 
Personal: Attribution by Receiver Frequency (Corrected Standardized Residual)
Intimate Social Abstract Total
Attribution Reciprocal  11 (3.5)  10 (3.2)  12 (-5.2)  33
Altruistic  0 (-2.1)  0 (-2.0)  18 (3.1)  18
Prejudice  3 (-1.8)  3 (-1.5)  32 (2.6)  38
Total  14  13  62  89
Source: own workIntracategorIal VarIetIes of contempt In a Heterogeneous sample
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ously expressed by those who narrated their per-
sonal episodes of contempt for reciprocal reasons, 
and less often expressed by people describing preju-
diced scenarios. 
The association of attribution with gender was 
nonsignificant, χ2 (2) = 1.76, Cramer’s V = 0.14, 
p = 0.415. One-way ANOVAs showed no differ-
ences associated with attribution in either emotion 
recognition ability (F (2, 87)= 1.86, p = 0.162) 
or age (F (2, 87) = 3.98, p = 0.022; Bonferroni 
corrected post-hoc analysis showed no significant 
differences).
Discussion
This study corroborates, in a heterogeneous sam-
ple, the previously found structure and variations 
-reciprocal, altruistic and prejudiced- of the expe-
rience of contempt. The moral role of contempt, 
a prevalent emotion in Spain (Delgado, 2009a), 
has not been limited to reciprocal scenarios, but 
altruistic ones have also appeared, especially 
when subjects reported personal experiences. 
However, contempt as prejudice is still the modal 
representation. 
Although the association of the spontaneous 
facial expression conventionally coded as disgust 
with contempt episodes is not new (e.g., Darwin, 
1872; Delgado 2009b), the fact that the convention-
ally called disgust face was shown more often in 
people who narrated personal episodes of contempt 
for reciprocal reasons, and less often in those de-
scribing prejudiced scenarios has not been reported 
before, as far as we know. This result indicates that 
intracategorial variability is not only detected in 
self-reports and written documents, but also in 
facial expressions. It is also consistent with recent 
experimental results by Moretti and di Pellegrino 
(2010) in an economic decision context. 
It could well be that what experimental psy-
chologists are now calling socio-moral disgust was 
just a metaphorical way of referring to contempt. 
If this is so, attempts to find a common neural net-
work could not be the best methodological strategy. 
Moretti and di Pellegrino (2010) have suggested 
that disgust is not a unitary concept, and we have 
found evidence for the intracategorial variability 
of contempt. As long as emotion varieties are not 
included in experimental designs, it will never be 
clear whether socio-moral disgust is a variety of 
contempt or vice versa. 
From a behavioral science perspective, it would 
be useful to carry out some research by means of 
structured interviews in order to investigate what 
action tendencies allow to differentiate among the 
CAD emotions. Although subjects seldom men-
tion action tendencies in open interviews, they are 
needed to behaviorally characterize the emotion 
varieties. 
No association of contempt varieties with 
commonly studied subject attributes (age, gender 
and emotion recognition abilities) were found, 
and thus they can be refuted as plausible explana-
tions for the varieties of contempt. Our results, 
calculated using a large and heterogeneous sam-
ple, do not show different contempt representa-
tions by gender, age or emotional intelligence (of 
which emotion recognition is a basic proxy). Were 
these results replicated in future studies, then 
some grounded theorization could be developed 
in order to account for them, allowing the deduc-
tion and testing of hypothesis. 
table 3 
Personal: Attribution by Spontaneous Expression of Disgust
Absent Present Total
Attribution Reciprocal  17 (-2.7)  16 (2.7)  33
Altruistic  13 (.3)  5 (-.3)  18
Prejudice  32 (2.4)  7 (-2.4)  39
Total  62  28  90
Source: own workAnA DelgADo, MArgAritA Márquez
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Finally, it is seldom mentioned that one of the 
main reasons for the artificiality of Moral Psychol-
ogy research (Bloom, 2010) is the lack of construct 
validity of manipulated variables. We believe that 
a good starting point for solving this problem is to 
take into account the results from bottom-up stud-
ies showing ecological evidence of intracategorial 
emotion variability.
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